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593 
THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 
AND A POSSIBLE END TO VIOLENCE AGAINST 
UNION MEMBERS IN COLOMBIA 
I. INTRODUCTION  
On February 27, 2006, the United States Trade Representative 
announced that the United States and Colombia had completed their 
negotiations for a bilateral trade agreement.1 American labor unions 
immediately voiced their strong opposition to this agreement, describing 
Colombia as “the most dangerous country in the world for workers 
seeking to exercise their freedom to form unions.”2 That statement is not 
an exaggeration.  
Since the mid-1980s approximately 4,000 labor union members have 
been killed in Colombia, with more than half of those killings occurring 
since 1991.3 In 2002, Colombia accounted for 85% of the world’s killings 
of union members.4 These killings are often committed with the implicit or 
explicit approval of employers and the Colombian government.5 Most of 
 
 
 1. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States and Colombia 
Conclude Free Trade Agreement (Feb. 27, 2006), available at http://www.ustr.gov/Document_ 
Library/Press_Releases/2006/February/United_States_Colombia_Conclude_Free_Trade_Agreement.ht
ml. 
 Even without this agreement, the United States has historically been Colombia’s largest trading 
partner. Bilateral trade between the United States and Colombia was an estimated $8.7 billion in 2002. 
Embassy of Colombia, Washington, D.C., U.S.-Colombia Bilateral Trade (2006), http://www. 
colombiaemb.org/opencms/ opencms/trade/index.html. 
 2. Letter from AFL-CIO to Senators in Opposition to Free Trade Agreements with Peru, 
Colombia, and Oman (Mar. 14, 2006), available at http://www.aflcio.org/issues/legislativealert/ 
alerts/upload/peru_colombia_oman_senateletter.pdf (citing INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF 
TRADE UNIONS, ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIOLATIONS OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS (2005)).  
 It is worth noting that the labor standards in the proposed U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement 
have been called “a major step back” from those currently in place under the Andean Trade Preference 
and Drug Eradication Act and the Generalized System of Preferences, both of which require 
compliance with International Labor Organization standards, whereas the proposed agreement merely 
requires Colombia to follow its own national law. THE AMERICAN CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL 
LABOR SOLIDARITY, JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE STRUGGLE FOR WORKER RIGHTS IN COLOMBIA 63 (Fay 
Lyle ed., 2006) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL]. It should be noted that the current Colombian 
constitution incorporates a number of International Labor Organization (ILO) Conventions, although 
these provisions have not been followed. See infra note 81. 
 3. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 11. 
 4. Daniel Kovalik, War and Human Rights Abuses: Colombia and Corporate Support for Anti-
Union Suppression, 2 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 393, 398 (2004) (citing U.S. STATE DEPT., 
COLOMBIA: COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES—2002 1, 39 (Mar. 31, 2003), 
available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18325.htm).  
 5. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 18. The American Center for International Labor 
Solidarity states:  
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the time, the killers escape with impunity, with over 90% of reported 
crimes against trade unionists going unsolved in 2005.6  
Yet there may be a reason for hope for the workers of Colombia: in 
June of 2006, representatives of the Colombian government, Colombian 
employers, and Colombian unions signed an historic agreement with the 
International Labor Organization (ILO)—the “Tripartite7 Agreement for 
the Right of Association and Democracy” (“the Agreement”). This Note 
examines the history of violence against union members in Colombia and 
the key provisions of the Agreement in order to evaluate the likely 
effectiveness of the Agreement in ending the violence. 
II. BACKGROUND: COLOMBIA, UNIONS, AND VIOLENCE 
The second half of the twentieth Century in Colombia was dominated 
by violence. From the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s a mostly rural civil 
war, referred to as “La Violencia,” led to the deaths of at least 180,000 
Colombians.8 Unfortunately, the 1957 power sharing agreement that ended 
“La Violencia” led to a new conflict.9 This section describes the guerilla 
 
 
In Colombia, a symbiotic relationship between government and employers, and the military 
or paramilitary forces that enforce their policies, works in concert to deny trade unions their 
rights. Selective and systemic violence against union leaders and members reinforces anti-
union strategies used by private employers and the Colombian state, thus merging 
government repression with anti-union discrimination. 
Id.  
 6. INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS, COLOMBIA: ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
VIOLATION OF TRADE UNIONS RIGHTS (2006), available at http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument. 
asp?Index=991223865&Language=EN.  
 7. Whenever used in the ILO context the term “tripartite” means comprised of representatives 
of the government, employer’s organizations, and worker’s organizations. 
 8. As it was a chaotic internal conflict occurring in a mostly rural nation, the details on “La 
Violencia,” including its starting and ending dates, and the number of casualties, are unclear. See José 
E. Arvelo, Note, International Law and Conflict Resolution in Colombia: Balancing Peace and Justice 
in the Paramilitary Demobilization Process, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 411, 416–17 (2002). While I use 
Arvelo’s casualty numbers in the text, he admits in note 17 that “scholarly estimates are by no means 
uniform” and refers to other scholars who use the figures 194,000 and 300,000. JUSTICE FOR ALL 
limits the dates of “La Violencia” to 1948–1958, and puts the number of casualties between 200,000 
and 300,000. No source is given for these figures. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 4. 
 9. Id. The American Center for International Labor Solidarity writes:  
In 1958, ‘La Violencia’ ended when Liberals and Conservatives formed the National Front, a 
two-party power sharing arrangement that excluded other social actors, planting the seeds for 
the emergence of the guerilla movement. Political exclusion of large sectors of civil society, 
an extremely skewed distribution of wealth, and the traditional power centers’ intolerance of 
dissent are widely considered the root causes of the conflict . . . . 
Id. (citing Gary Leech, Fifty Years of Violence, COLOMBIA J. ONLINE, May 1999, 
http://www.colombiajournal.org/fiftyyearsofviolence.htm). See also Arvelo, supra note 8, at 416 
(blaming the continuing social conflict regarding agrarian interest and the lack of a state presence in 
the interior of Colombia for the start of the guerilla conflict). 
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and paramilitary groups that have fought in the new conflict, examines the 
effect that this conflict has had on labor unions, and evaluates the recently 
enacted Law of Peace and Justice which represents the Colombian 
government’s attempt to put its nation’s bloody past behind it.  
A. The Guerillas and the Paramilitaries 
In 1964, the two largest leftist guerilla organizations, FARC (Colombia 
Revolutionary Armed Forces) and ELN (National Liberation Army), 
formed and have fought the government ever since.10 In the mid-1980s, 
wealthy drug lords started forming right-wing paramilitary groups, 
ostensibly to protect their holdings from attack by guerillas.11 By 1997, 
many of these paramilitary groups had been organized into a loose 
confederation known as the AUC (“United Self-Defense Forces of 
Colombia”) which has an estimated 32,000 members.12 In areas they 
control, paramilitaries have effectively replaced the state, allowing them to 
freely participate in drug trafficking and other illegal activities in those 
areas.13 Despite the paramilitaries’ challenge to state authority and the fact 
that they were outlawed in 1989,14 the paramilitaries and the Colombian 
government have collaborated in a “functional alliance” to fight the 
guerillas.15  
The result of this three-sided civil war is that Colombia has become 
one of the most violent countries on Earth.16 Between 1997 and 2002, 
approximately 28,000 people were killed as a result of this conflict, with 
17,776 of those deaths being non-combat killings of civilians.17  
 
 
 10. See Center for International Policy, Colombia Programs, Information About the Combatants 
(Dec. 5, 2004), available at http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm. FARC is estimated to 
currently have 18,000 combatants, while ELN is believed to have 3,500. Id. To finance their 
operations both FARC and ELN have been involved in extortion and kidnapping. Arvelo, supra note 
8, at 419. 
 11. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 4. 
 12. Center for International Policy, supra note 10. 
 13. Arvelo, supra note 8, at 421–22. 
 14. See Center for International Policy, supra note 10. 
 15. Arvelo, supra note 8, at 421. 
 16. The yearly murder rate in Colombia is approaching 100 per 100,000 people. JUSTICE FOR 
ALL, supra note 2, at 11 (citing KIM CRAGIN & BRUCE HOFFMAN, RAND NATIONAL DEFENSE 
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, ARMS TRAFFICKING AND COLOMBIA (2003), available at http://www.rand.org). 
 17. Arvelo, supra note 8, at 411 (citing UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, INFORME 
NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO HUMANO PARA COLOMBIA: EL CONFLICTO, CALLEJÓN CON SALIDA 
[NATIONAL REPORT ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT FOR COLOMBIA: THE CONFLICT, ALLEY WITH AN 
EXIT] 119–20, tbls. 5.1–5.2 (2003)).  
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B. Attacks on Union Members 
Colombian unions have been devastated by the violence in their nation. 
Historically, Colombian unions were among the strongest in Latin 
America.18 However, this started to change in the late 1980s when 
paramilitaries gained power and attacks on union members increased.19 A 
study by one of Colombia’s three major trade union centers found that as 
of 2005 only 4.8% of the Colombian workforce was organized,20 and only 
1.17% of the workforce was covered by collective bargaining 
agreements.21 
The evidence clearly indicates that union members are specifically 
targeted for violence, rather than merely being caught in the crossfire.22 
 
 
 18. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 11 (noting that Colombian trade unions had “won 
significant benefits for workers” prior to the 1990s). Although I have been unable to locate statistics 
regarding the highest point of union membership in Colombia, JUSTICE FOR ALL states that the 
enactment of pro-labor legislation in the 1930s and 1940s led to union membership rising from 5% in 
1947 to 15% in 1964, although noting that “it also made unions increasingly dependent on the state for 
protection and gains in collective bargaining.” Id. at 10. 
 Colombia’s unions have also faced problems with government and employer sanctioned violence 
in the past, most notably with the 1928 banana worker strike in Cienaga, Colombia, when the 
“Colombian military massacred striking banana workers at the behest of the Boston-based United Fruit 
Company.” Kovalik, supra note 4, at 398 (citing GARRY M. LEECH, KILLING PEACE: COLOMBIA’S 
CONFLICT AND THE FAILURE OF U.S. INTERVENTION 10 (2002)). This strike was the inspiration for 
Gabriel Garcia Marquez’s novel One Hundred Years of Solitude. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 
10.  
 19. Id. at 11. While the report refers to the “period beginning in 1990” as a turning point in the 
declining power of trade unions in Colombia, it gives no reason for the 1990 start date. I use the late-
1980s as it was in this decade that most statistics regarding trade union murders in Colombia begin.  
 The American Center for International Labor Solidarity summarizes the connection between 
violence against union members and the decline in union membership: “The largest single obstacle to 
workers rights in Colombia today is the climate of violence with impunity, since the right to live is a 
fundamental prerequisite for the exercise of any other right.” Id. at 17. 
 20. Id. at 11 (citing U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES—
2005 28 (Mar. 8, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61721.htm and 
WORKERS CENTRAL UNION (CUT), SITUACIÓN LABORAL EN COLOMBIA, (Mar. 2005)). 
 21. INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF FREE TRADE UNIONS, COLOMBIA: ANNUAL SURVEY OF 
VIOLATIONS OF TRADE UNION RIGHTS (2005), available at http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument. 
asp?Index=991222215&Language=EN.  
 22. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 11. A letter sent in December 2003 by AUC paramilitaries 
to a former employee and union activist at a mine owned by the American-owned Drummond Coal 
Company (then living in exile) demonstrates that the paramilitaries target union members because of 
their union activities: 
We want to let you know that we have knowledge of your activities against Drummond Ltd. 
You should know that we have located you . . . as well as your family . . . . The command has 
decided to reactivate operations against you for being enemies of development and impeding 
foreign investment such as in the case of the Drummond company . . . .This position of yours 
is what has brought our organization to declare you as enemies and to make your 
extermination and subjugation our goal; therefore, we inform you, your colleagues, and the 
organizations that support them that they will be sought and executed in the country or place 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol7/iss3/7
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008] THE INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 597 
 
 
 
 
One indication of this is that violence against union members is almost 
always carried out by paramilitaries or government forces.23 When the 
paramilitaries and the government try to justify the killings, they claim the 
union members are guerillas.24 While that is true of a few individual 
members, guerillas do not dominate any unions in Colombia.25 Rather, the 
roots of the violence lie in the hostility of the government26 and private 
employers27 towards unions. Employers often bring in paramilitary 
members for “security” during labor negotiation—with the true goal being 
 
 
where they are found; if they continue to pressure companies that bring investment and 
development to our country. 
Kovalik, supra note 4, at 406–07. The name of the union activist was withheld for security reasons. 
 23. In 2005, a Colombian labor rights nongovernmental organization (NGO), ENS (National 
Labor School) attributed 52% of the violations against union members committed by a known 
assailant to paramilitaries and 45.7% to the government, with just 2.3% being attributed to guerillas. 
JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 18 (citing ESCUELA NACIONAL SINDICAL (ENS), INFORMAL SOBRE 
LA VIOLACIÓN A LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS DE LOS Y LAS SINDICALISTAS COLOMBIANOS EN EL AÑO 
2005 10, 12 (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www.ens.org.co/aa/img_upload/40785cb6c10f663e3 
ec6ea7ea03aaa15/INFORME_DE_DDHH_DE_SINDICALISTAS_COLOMBIANOS_EN_EL_2005.
pdf). Note that my percentages are taken from dividing the percentage of violations that each group is 
known to be responsible for by the total percentage of violations for which the assailant is known 
(39.4% of cases). In ENS’s statistics, paramilitaries are responsible for 20.5% of total violations, with 
18% being the work of state institutions .9% being attributed to guerillas, and 60.6% attributed to 
unknown assailants. Id.  
 24. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 11. 
 25. Id. The report states that “[a]s institution, trade union centers have rejected all armed actors 
in the conflict. They seek civil society participation in the peace negotiations, and reform of 
Colombia’s structural social inequality, which they see as the root cause of the armed conflict.” Id. 
 The report also states that “[t]hough guerilla violence against trade unions has diminished in the 
last few years, union leaders are still viewed with suspicion by some guerilla leaders because they 
represent strong expressions of organized civil society that the guerillas do not control.” Id. at 19. 
 26. Id. at 18–19. Regardless of the laws that Colombia’s government has protecting workers’ 
rights to unionize, the government is hostile towards unions in the public sector where “[u]nion leaders 
who denounce corruption in public institutions are often labeled guerilla sympathizers by public 
officials who wish to deflect criticism, leaving union leaders vulnerable to paramilitary attacks.” Id. at 
18. Teachers’ unions are especially hard hit as 71% of the violations in 2005 were against teachers 
who belonged to the Colombian Federation of Educators (FECODE). Id. at 19 (citing ESCUELA 
NACIONAL SINDICAL, INFORMAL SOBRE LA VIOLACIÓN A LOS DERECHOS HUMANOS DE LOS Y LAS 
SINDICALISTAS COLOMBIANOS EN EL AÑO 2005 9 (Mar. 15, 2006), available at http://www.ens.org.co/ 
aa/img_upload/40785cb6c10f663e3ec6ea7ea03aaa15/INFORME_DE_DDHH_DE_SINDICALISTAS
_COLOMBIANOS_EN_EL_2005.pdf).  
 27. Kovalik, supra note 4, at 398. Kovalik states that “[t]he paramilitaries, along with their 
Colombian military partners, are ideologically aligned with the interests of both domestic and foreign 
capital in Colombia and are many times assisted by the corporate elite, including multinational 
corporations based in the United States.” Id.  
 Earlier, Kovalik noted that: “In a number of cases, U.S.-based multinational corporations, some of 
which have been vocal supporters and direct beneficiaries of U.S. military aid to Colombia, have been 
complicit with both military and paramilitary forces in Colombia that intimidate, torture, and even 
assassinate . . . trade unionists.” Id. at 393. 
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to break the trade union.28 These arrangements usually result in the deaths 
of the labor leaders.29  
A further indication that the attacks on union members are not 
coincidental is that the types of attacks have shifted over time. When 
wholesale massacres of union members drew international outrage in the 
mid-1990s, the murderers started targeting union officials and leaders.30 
Similarly, while the seventy trade union murders in Colombia in 200531 
represented a decrease from previous years,32 other forms of violence 
 
 
 28. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 19. Even when foreign corporations do not seek the 
paramilitaries they often become entangled with them or the guerillas through extortion by the group 
that controls the area. Id. at 64–65. The report quotes Ron Oswald, general secretary of the 
International Union of Food, Agricultural, Hotel, Restaurant, Catering, Tobacco, and Allied Workers 
Association (IUF) (which has affiliates in Colombia) as stating, “It’s certainly a common 
understanding that in order to do business in Colombia, payments have to be made for at best security, 
or at worst extortion. The alternative, of course, is not to do business in Colombia.” Id. (citing 
Interview, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER (May 11, 2004)). 
 As an illustration, the report notes:  
In May 2004, Chiquita Brands International, the world’s largest banana company, became the 
first company to acknowledge protection payments, when it revealed that it has been the 
subject of a U.S. Department of Justice investigation into this practice. The company said it 
alerted the Justice Department to the payments back in April 2003 when it became aware that 
the recipient of the payments was on the State Department’s list of foreign terrorist 
organizations and that such payments were therefore against the law.  
Id. at 65. Indeed, the ELN, FARC, and AUC are all on the U.S. government’s list of foreign terrorist 
organizations. U.S. State Dept., Foreign Terrorist Organizations Fact Sheet, available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/37191.htm (last visited Feb. 28, 2008). ELN is number 28, FARC is 
number 37, and AUC number 42. 
 29. See generally Kovalik, supra note 4 (detailing how a Coca Cola bottling plant and a 
Drummond Coal Company facility wound up in United States District Court under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act because of their relationship with paramilitaries who killed trade union members). JUSTICE 
FOR ALL also discusses Drummond Coal, supra note 2, at 32–34, and Coca Cola, id. at 34–37. 
 30. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 18. While only 22% of union members killed between 
1991 and December 2003 were leaders, 39.5% of union members killed in 2003 were leaders. Id. 
(citing ESCUELA NACIONAL SINDICAL (ENS), INFORME SOBRE LA VIOLACIÓN A LOS DERECHOS 
HUMANOS DE LOS SINDICALISTAS COLOMBIANOS ENERO 1–31 DE DICIEMBRE 2003 9 (2004), available 
at http://www.ens.org.co/aa/img_upload/40785c66c10f663e3ec6ea7en03aaa/IS/INFORME_DE_ 
DDHH -DE_SINDICALISTAS_COLOMBIANOS-EN-EL_2005.pdf).  
 The percentage of union leaders amongst the murdered union members has declined slightly since 
2003, with union leaders making up 31.4% in 2004 and 30.2% in 2005.  
 31. COLOMBIA: ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIOLATION OF TRADE UNIONS RIGHTS (2006), supra note 
6. The Colombian government reports an even greater decrease in killings of union members, claiming 
only 40 occurred in 2005. Gustavo Capdevila, Rights—Colombia: Some Hits, Some Misses on Int’l 
Report Cards, RESOURCE CENTRE FOR THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES (June 4, 2006), 
http://www.galdu.org/web/index-php?odas=1209&giella1=eng. It is likely that neither number is 
correct; I use ENS’s number because the Colombian government has more to gain by making the 
number as low as possible. 
 32. I have not yet located either ENS’s or the Colombian government’s numbers for trade union 
murders in 2004, but both the above cited sources call 2005’s numbers a decrease. 
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against union members, such as harassment and abductions, have 
increased.33 
In 2006, there were seventy-seven murders of union members,34 seven 
more than in 2005, yet still a significant decrease compared to only four 
years prior. But whatever decrease there has been in union murders is not 
the result of effective law enforcement by the Colombian government, as 
very few of the murders have been investigated, let alone solved.35 The 
violence will likely continue as long as the perpetrators are allowed to act 
with impunity.36 
C. The Peace and Justice Law 
The problem of violence against union members must be understood in 
the larger context of the Colombian government’s stance towards human 
rights violations by paramilitaries. The foundation of that policy is the 
Peace and Justice Law (Ley de Justica y Paz) passed in June 2005. 
In August 2002, recently elected Colombian President Alvaro Uribe 
offered to negotiate for peace with the AUC paramilitaries. On July 15, 
2003, the government announced the Rilato Accord, wherein the 
 
 
 33. ENS reports that there was an 88.2% increase in “harassment and persecution” of trade 
unionists and a 20% rise in abductions of trade unionists. COLOMBIA: ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIOLATION 
OF TRADE UNIONS RIGHTS (2006), supra note 6 (citing information provided by ENS). In total, ENS 
reports that 2005 saw 444 attacks on trade unionists consisting of “70 murders, 260 death threats, 56 
arbitrary arrests, seven attempted murders . . ., 32 cases of harassment, eight forced removals, three 
disappearances, and one eviction from a person’s home.” Id. ICFTU notes that these figures are not 
exact because of violations that are not reported. Id.  
 34. E-mail from Esperanza Avalos, Program Officer, Americas, American Center for 
International Labor Solidarity (Feb. 12, 2007) (spreadsheet listing the victims of trade union murders) 
(on file with author). 
 35. According to Colombia’s National Prosecutorial Unit on Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law, more than 3,000 trade unionists were killed between 1986 and 2002; however, there have only 
been 376 investigations into trade union murders, and only five guilty verdicts issued. JUSTICE FOR 
ALL, supra note 2, at 20 (citing REPORT TO THE 90TH INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE 
SUBMITTED BY THE COLOMBIAN TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS (June 3–20, 2002), available at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc90/reports.htm).  
 36. On the necessity of ending impunity to end the violence, the ILO’s Committee on Freedom 
of Association remarked: 
In these conditions, the Committee is bound to reiterate the conclusions it reached in its 
previous examinations of the case, namely, that the lack of investigations in some cases, the 
limited progress in the investigations already begun in other cases and the total lack of 
convictions underscore the prevailing state of impunity, which inevitably contributes to the 
climate of violence affecting all sectors of society and the destruction of the trade union 
movement. 
Int’l Labor Organization Committee on Freedom of Association, Case No. 1787. Report No. 337, 
¶ 539 (June 2005), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb293/pdf/ 
gb-7.pdf (emphasis added).  
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paramilitaries agreed to end hostilities and demobilize.37 In return, the 
government promised to help demobilized paramilitary members 
reintegrate into society.38 After a tumultuous debate between the Uribe 
Administration’s proposal, which emphasized reintegrating demobilized 
paramilitaries into society as swiftly as possible,39 and counterproposals 
from legislators more concerned with holding paramilitaries accountable 
for their crimes,40 the Peace and Justice Law emerged as something of a 
compromise.  
The Peace and Justice Law sentences guerillas and paramilitaries guilty 
of serious crimes who demobilize to a “deprivation of freedom” of 
between five and eight years.41 To qualify under the law guerillas and 
paramilitaries must cease all illegal activity, confess the facts of their 
crimes, and promote activities aimed at the demobilization of their 
group,42 among other requirements.43 Colombia’s Constitutional Court 
struck down some of the more controversial provisions of the Law of 
Peace and Justice in May 2006,44 such as placing strict time limits on 
criminal investigations of demobilized paramilitaries.45 The Colombian 
 
 
 37. Arvelo, supra note 8, at 425–26 (citing Rialto Accord, arts. 2, 6).  
 38. Id. at 426 (citing Rilato Accord, art. 1).  
 39. The Uribe Administration’s original proposal to meet this promise would have allowed 
former combatants who admitted to their crimes to be spared jail time and instead “simply lose their 
rights to (1) serve in any public capacity, (2) bear arms, or (3) move freely” provided they maintain 
good behavior and took “actions that would effectively contribute to the reparation of victims, the 
overcoming of the conflict, and the achievement of peace” such as transferring property back to 
victims or performing social work. Id. at 433–34 (citing PROYECTO DE LEY ESTATUTARIA 85 DE 2003, 
SENADO: POR EL CUAL SE DICTAN DISPOSICIONES PARA FACILITAR LA RECONCILIACIÓN Y CONTRIBUIR 
A LA REPARACIÓN DE LAS VÍCTIMAS, art. 2, 11(a)–(g), 6, available at http://www.uasb.edu.ec/padh/ 
revista7/actualidad/proyecto.htm) (citations omitted). 
 40. Senator Rafael Pardo put forward an alternative bill, which was supported by human rights 
groups in Colombia and internationally. Pardo’s bill emphasized the government’s duty to 
“investigate, capture, and punish ‘effectively’ those responsible for grave breaches of human rights 
and international humanitarian law, and to . . . prevent the recurrence of such violations.” Id. at 436 
(citing LEY POR LA CUAL SE DICTAN DISPOSICIONES PARA LA REINCORPORACIÓN DE MIEMBROS DE 
GRUPOS ARMADAS ORGANIZADOS AL MARGEN DE LA LEY, QUE CONTRIBUYAN DE MANERA EFECTIVA A 
LA CONSECUCIÓN DE LA PAZ NACIONAL (Dec. 14, 2004), art. 5, available at http://www.seguridady 
democracia.org/does/pdf/extemos/VERDAD%20Y%20REPARACION%20BPPF.doc).  
 41. Id. at 437–38 (citing Arvelo’s translation of the Law of Peace and Justice, arts. 30, 31).  
 42. Id. at 438 (citing Arvelo’s translation of the Law of Peace and Justice, arts. 10–11, 30). 
 43. These other requirements include returning all property illegally acquired as part of past 
crimes and committing to work, study, or teach during their “deprivation of freedom” period. Id. 
 44. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, COLOMBIA: KILLINGS, ARBITRARY DETENTIONS, AND DEATH 
THREATS—THE REALITY OF TRADE UNIONISM IN COLOMBIA 41 (2007), http://asiapacific.amnesty. 
org/library/pdf/AMR230012007ENGLISH/$File/AMR2300107.pdf. 
 45. Id. at 41–42. 
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government responded to this ruling by issuing a decree in September 
2006 which revived some of these provisions.46  
Labor unions in Colombia, and internationally, have been among the 
fiercest critics of the Law of Peace and Justice, dubbing it the “Law of 
Impunity.”47 The law has been criticized on a number of grounds, perhaps 
most harshly for requiring sentences that are considered too lenient.48 Most 
seriously of all, observers, including the U.S. State Department, have 
noted that the law has not stopped paramilitaries from violating the cease 
fire agreement and committing numerous human rights violations, 
including murdering union members.49 Although the Colombian 
government sees it as necessary to end the violence, the Law of Peace and 
Justice could hinder future efforts to hold paramilitaries accountable for 
crimes against union members.50 
III. ISSUE: THE ILO AND THE AGREEMENT 
The “Tripartite Agreement for the Right of Association and 
Democracy,” signed by representatives of the Colombian government, 
Colombian employers, Colombian unions, and the ILO, could lead to an 
end of the violence against Colombian union members. This section of the 
Note briefly examines the history of the ILO’s involvement in Colombia 
and describes the terms of the Agreement.  
A. History of the ILO’s Involvement in Colombia 
The International Labor Organization’s Committee on the Application 
of Standards has been investigating the violence against union members in 
 
 
 46. Id. at 42.  
 47. COLOMBIA: ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIOLATIONS OF TRADE UNIONS RIGHTS (2006), supra note 
6.  
 48. Id. (stating that the Peace and Justice Law allows perpetrators of serious crimes to serve their 
sentences “on farms”). See also American Federation of Labor & Congress of Industrial Organizations 
(AFL-CIO), Workers’ Rights, Violence and Impunity in Colombia (Jan. 2008), http://www.aflcio.org/ 
issues/jobeconomy/globaleconomy/upload/Colombia_briefing.pdf (detailing how the Law of Peace 
and Justice could result in the maximum sentence of forty years in prison being reduced to as little as 
three and a half years).  
 49. U.S. STATE DEPT., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 2005 (Mar. 8, 2006), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005/61721.htm.  
 50. The suggestion in JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 66, is that the Colombian government 
must “[p]rotect the human and civil rights of trade unionists by . . . [i]nvestigating, arresting, 
prosecuting, convicting, and punishing the persons responsible for the killings of approximately 4,000 
trade unionists since 1986.” This seems to ignore the possibility that many of these individuals may 
have already demobilized, confessed, and served their “deprivation of freedom” period in accordance 
with the Peace and Justice Law, thereby closing the book on those cases.  
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Colombia for almost as long as the violence has been occurring.51 In 
October 2005, the ILO sent a delegation to observe the situation in 
Colombia.52 The committee found that violence against trade unions 
continued “despite the government’s recognition of the importance of the 
problem and the numerous efforts made to tackle it . . . the reality is that 
impunity prevails.”53 The mission led to further dialogue among the 
Colombian government, workers, employers, and the ILO, which 
culminated in the creation of the “Tripartite Agreement for the Right of 
Association and Democracy.”54  
B. The Agreement 
The Agreement consists of four components, each of which require 
action by either the ILO, the Colombian government, or both. The first 
component calls for “permanent representation” of the ILO in Colombia, 
focused on “technical cooperation to promote decent work, including the 
promotion and defense of the fundamental rights of workers” and 
specifically noting the workers’ right to life and right to organize.55 On 
October 18, 2006, representatives of the Colombian government, unions, 
and employers organizations (the Tripartite Working Group), assisted by 
an ILO official, defined the mandate of the ILO representative in 
Colombia.56 The second component calls for the Colombian government 
 
 
 51. Press Release, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Tripartite Agreement on a 
Permanent ILO Presence in Colombia (June 2, 2006), http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp? 
Index=991224505&Language=EN (stating that the ILO’s Committee on the Application of Standards 
“has been examining the case of Colombia without interruption for almost twenty years”). 
 52. Id. 
 53. INTERNATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF TRADE UNIONS, supra note 6. 
 54. The Agreement was signed on June 1, 2006, in Geneva by the Deputy Minister of Industrial 
Relations, representatives of the three main trade union associations (CUT, CGT, and CTC) and a 
representative of ANDI, an employers association. “Tripartite Agreement for the Right of Association 
and Democracy,” E-mail from Maria Marta Travieso, Standards Dept. of ILO, to author (Sept. 9, 2006, 
04:30 CST) (on file with author).  
 55. Agreement, supra note 54, para. (a). The paragraph reads in its entirety:  
The Colombian Government will agree with the ILO Office and with the support of workers 
and employers on the renewed presence of this international Organization in the country, in 
the form of a permanent representation of the Organization, with as its principal priorities 
technical cooperation to promote decent work, including the promotion and defense of the 
fundamental rights of workers, their trade union leaders and organizations, particularly in 
relation to life, the right to organize, freedom of association and expression, collective 
bargaining, and free enterprise for employers. The parties urge the Governing Body to give 
effect to this agreement, as well as to the logistical and structural aspects of its 
implementation. 
 56. International Labor Organization Committee on Technical Cooperation, Colombia: Tripartite 
Agreement on Freedom of Association and Democracy, at app. I. para. 8, GB. 297/TC1512 (Nov. 
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and the ILO to ensure that the program has sufficient financial support,57 
while the third component calls for the parties to “give strict effect to the 
findings of the special investigation group established by the Office of the 
Attorney General of the Nation for the investigation and punishment of 
crimes against the life and freedom of trade union leaders and workers.”58 
The final component calls for a “National Dialogue Commission on 
Labour and Wage Policy” to be convened “with a permanent agenda,” 
with the ILO being invited to join these meetings.59 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The major Colombian trade unions issued a statement declaring that 
they expect “significant progress to result from the implementation of this 
agreement.”60 Colombia’s Deputy Minister of Labor Relations hailed it as 
“an historic document.”61 The United States Trade Representative’s 
statement on the signing of the U.S.-Colombia Trade Promotion 
Agreement noted that the Tripartite Agreement was a sign of the progress 
made by the Uribe Administration in the area of human rights.62 Yet 
despite these optimistic statements, it is uncertain whether this agreement 
will lead to an end to violence against union members in Colombia.  
 
 
2006), http://www.ilo.org/public/English/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb297/pdf/tc-5-2.pdf [hereinafter 
ILO Agenda]. The signatories for the Colombian government, unions, and employers, were the same 
as those who signed the Agreement. Compare “Tripartite Agreement for the Right of Association and 
Democracy,” supra note 54, with ILO Agenda, app. III. 
 57. Agreement, supra note 54, para. (b). The paragraph reads in its entirety:  
In relation to technical cooperation, the Colombian Government undertakes to work for 
economic support to guarantee the implementation of the proposed aims and will request the 
financial support of the ILO for this purpose. In this respect, the National Government will 
make available the resources to ensure the commencement and sustainability of the 
programme. We also request the ILO to seek additional resources from donor countries and 
other international bodies to strength the cooperation programme. 
 58. Agreement, supra note 54, para. (c). This paragraph is quoted in its entirety except for an 
introductory clause: “With a view to combating impunity, the parties agree . . .”  
 59. Agreement, supra note 54, para. (d). The paragraph in its entirety reads:  
We, the Colombian Government, employers and workers, undertake to promote and achieve 
the aims of the ILO in relation to fundamental labour rights. For this purpose, the National 
Dialogue Commission on Labour and Wage Policy will be convened with a permanent 
agenda and the ILO will be invited to accompany its meetings.  
Id. 
 60. Tripartite Agreement on a Permanent ILO Presence in Colombia, supra note 51.  
 61. Capdevila, supra note 31, at 1.  
 62. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States and Colombia 
Sign Trade Promotion Agreement (Nov. 22, 2006), http://www.ustr.gov/Document_Library/ 
Press_Releases/2006/November/United_States_Colombia_Sign_Trade_Promotion_Agreement.html. 
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This section evaluates the Agreement’s chances for success by 
focusing on the establishment of an ILO representative in Colombia (the 
first component), and the Attorney General’s investigations into the trade 
union murders (the third component), as these are widely regarded as the 
most important for the success of the agreement.63 By examining the 
details of the ILO representative’s mandate in Colombia and the efforts of 
the Colombian Attorney General’s Special Investigative Group, it 
becomes clear that continued progress towards ending violence against 
union members in Colombia depends upon the Colombian government’s 
commitment to the problem.  
 
 
 63. Press Release, International Labor Organization, ILO Governing Body Concludes 297th 
Session: Considers Labor Situation in Myanmar, Belarus and Other Countries (Nov. 17 2006), 
http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Media_and_public_information/Press_releases/lang--
en/WCMS_080622/index.htm (noting that the Agreement included a permanent ILO representative 
and a “careful follow-up” of the findings of the Public Prosecutor). See also Capdevila, supra note 31 
(an article about how the Agreement emphasizes an ILO permanent presence in Colombia and the 
problem of impunity; the article does not mention financing of the Agreement or the Commission on 
Labor and Wage Policy). 
 Focusing on the first and third components of the Agreement does not diminish the importance of 
the other two components to the Agreement’s success. In particular, the second component—
funding—is essential for the success of both the technical cooperation program and the Attorney 
General’s investigation.  
 Both Colombia and the ILO have severe budget problems: Colombia had a $5.132 billion budget 
deficit in 2007, and a public debt estimated at 53.9% of the GDP. CIA, WORLD FACTBOOK (2007), 
available at http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/goes/co.html. As of 2002, the 
ILO also had a deficit of $37 million. Encyclopedia of Nations, The International Labor Organization: 
Budget (2007), http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/United-Nations-Related-Agencies/The- 
International-Labour-Organization-ILO-BUDGET.html. Nevertheless, both Colombia and the ILO 
have already come up with some money to finance the Agreement. The Colombian government has 
announced its hope to spend $5 million over the next four years to finance four projects under the 
technical assistance program, with $1.8 million in the next budget earmarked for preliminary activities 
on these projects. ILO Agenda Nov. 2006, supra note 56, at app. I, para. 11. The ILO has set aside a 
“cash surplus fund” to “finance support activities for the implementation of the Tripartite Agreement,” 
which currently amounts to just over $1 million. Id. at app. I, para. 14 (as of November 2006, the cash 
surplus fund held $1,093,041). 
 Both the ILO and Colombia have committed to seeking foreign aid to help finance the Agreement. 
The ILO’s permanent representative in Colombia is “encouraging member States also to provide 
resources” in support of the Colombia program. Id. at app. I, para. 15. The Colombian government has 
put the issue of “decent work” in its National Development Plan, thus allowing it to request foreign aid 
in support of the program. Id. at app. I, para. 13. 
 The “National Commission on Wage and Labor Policies,” infra text accompanying note 104, 
appears to be primarily an instrument for tripartite dialogue and is discussed briefly in that context. It 
also appears to have been originally created in the Colombian Constitution. See infra note 81. 
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A. Workers’ Rights and Technical Cooperation 
The first paragraph of the Agreement calls for the establishment of an 
ILO presence in Colombia focused on protecting workers’ rights, 
especially their right to organize and other rights necessary for 
unionizing.64 The heart of that paragraph is the declaration that the ILO 
will provide “technical cooperation” to Colombia to further the goals of 
the Agreement.65  
Since 1998, over fifty nations have sought ILO technical cooperation to 
improve their capacity for the realization of workers’ rights, especially 
their right to organize.66 The ILO’s main types of technical cooperation 
programs for furthering workers’ rights are awareness raising, labor law 
reform, administrative reform and promotion of alternative dispute 
 
 
 64. See Agreement, supra note 54, at para. (a). 
 65. The paragraph also mentions another key ILO concept, “decent work,” which has been at the 
heart of the ILO’s development programs since 1999. INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION 
COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND SOCIAL POLICY, A REVIEW OF THE ILO DECENT WORK PILOT 
PROGRAM, 1, Nov. 2003. The ILO describes “decent work” as follows: 
The overarching objective of the ILO has been re-phrased as the promotion of opportunities 
for women and men to obtain decent and productive work in conditions of freedom, equity, 
security and human dignity. Decent work is the converging focus of the four strategic 
objectives, namely rights at work, employment, social protection and social dialogue. Decent 
work is an organizing concept for the ILO in order to provide an overall framework for action 
in economic and social development.  
ILO, DECENT WORK: THE THEME IN BRIEF (2006), http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/ 
integration/decent/index.htm (website cannot be accessed without permission). 
 The ILO considers freedom of association and the right to organize essential parts of the decent 
work concept. ILO Director-General, Your Voice at Work: Global Report Under the Follow-up to the 
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, VIII (2000). 
 In 2002–2003, the ILO and interested member nations began designing “Decent Work Pilot 
Programs” to help implement the decent work concept at the national level. A REVIEW OF THE ILO 
DECENT WORK PILOT PROGRAM, at 1–2. However, only one of the original seven countries with 
approved pilot programs, Bahrain, focused on the right to organize. See generally ILO, NATIONAL 
POLICY GROUP DEPARTMENT OF POLICY INTEGRATION, DECENT WORK PILOT PROGRAM COUNTRY 
BRIEFS 3–9 (July 2003). Therefore, although freedom of association is encompassed in the decent 
work concept, and is mentioned in the Tripartite Agreement, there is no history to indicate that a 
decent work program would be as useful in Colombia as the ILO’s other technical cooperation 
programs. However, it should be noted that the International Trade Union Confederation considers a 
decent work program essential for the improvement of labor conditions in Colombia. INT’L TRADE 
UNION CONFEDERATION], INTERNATIONALLY-RECOGNIZED CORE LABOR STANDARDS IN COLOMBIA: 
REPORT FOR THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL REVIEW OF THE TRADE POLICIES OF COLOMBIA 17 (Nov. 
2006). However, the report also addresses forced labor, employment discrimination, and other labor 
problems besides violence against union members. Id. 
 66. ILO Director-General, Organizing for Social Justice: Global Report Under the Follow-up to 
the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 82 International Labour 
Conference, Report 1(B) (92nd Session 2004), http://www.ilo.org/dgn/declares/DECLARATION 
WEB.GLOBALREPORTDETAILS?var_language=Enofvar_PublicationsID=2973&var_ReportType=
Report# [hereinafter Organizing for Social Justice].  
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resolution, and strengthening the organizing and collective bargaining 
ability of workers’ organizations and employers’ organizations.67 All but 
the last of these types of programs are included in the mandate of the ILO 
representative in Colombia.68  
1. Case Studies: The Importance of Political Will 
Before evaluating the technical cooperation program to be used in 
Colombia, it is worth noting the factors that have led to successful ILO 
programs elsewhere. While none of the ILO’s past technical cooperation 
programs faced a situation as extreme as Colombia’s in terms of violence 
against workers, a 2000 ILO report described two “success stories” in 
historically difficult situations that have some parallels to Colombia: 
Indonesia and South Africa.69  
In both Indonesia and South Africa, the ILO became involved in a 
situation that posed an extreme threat to workers’ rights. In Indonesia, 
there were murders, disappearances, arrests, and detentions of trade union 
members.70 In South Africa, Apartheid had created vast economic 
inequality, including the lack of recognition of unions founded by blacks.71 
The types of ILO programs varied between the countries. While the 
Indonesian effort focused almost entirely on labor law reform,72 the South 
African programs included not only legal reforms, but also the formation 
of a tripartite National Manpower Commission and training programs that 
fostered the development of collective bargaining and alternative dispute 
resolution.73  
The ILO noted that in both cases, the key to the success of the technical 
cooperation programs was that the governments of the countries exhibited 
 
 
 67. Id. at 83.  
 68. The fourth method, capacity raising for unions and employers organizations, which teaches 
them how to handle everyday tasks such as grievance procedures, is primarily used in countries where 
these types of organizations have not historically existed. Id. at 92–93. Bulgaria, Romania, Niger, 
Benin, Senegal, Togo, and Burkina Faso are cited as nations where capacity building programs for 
unions and employer organizations have been a priority. Id. at 93. None of the programs in the ILO 
representative in Colombia’s mandate appear to be capacity building functions. 
 69. Your Voice at Work, supra note 65, at 46–54. The other two case studies, which seem to have 
fewer parallels with Colombia, were Poland and Costa Rica.  
 70. Id. at 46.  
 71. Id. at 48. 
 72. Id. at 46. These legal reforms led to the formation of a number of new trade unions and the 
release of union members who were unjustly imprisoned. Id.  
 73. Id. at 48. The emphasis on creating a tripartite commission and promoting alternative dispute 
resolution is a notable similarity between the Colombian and South African ILO programs. See infra 
notes 104 and 105 and accompanying text. 
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the political will to resolve their labor problems.74 Indeed, the ILO 
emphasized that while it was involved in the labor law reform process in 
Indonesia, the Indonesian government wrote the new laws with input from 
workers and employers.75 Similarly, the ILO’s South African programs 
reinforced a framework developed by the post-Apartheid government.76 
2. Awareness Raising 
The ILO considers spreading awareness of the workers’ right to 
organize to employers, workers, and government officials in ILO member 
nations to be one of its most important tasks.77 Several of the 
responsibilities of the ILO permanent representative in Colombia include 
an awareness-raising component.  
The ILO representative has a duty to “promote and organize training 
activities” for both unions78 and all three branches of the government79—
yet it does not have a similar mission to organize training activities for 
employers (although it did provide such training in October 2006, at the 
invitation of the largest employer’s association in Colombia).80 The ILO 
representative in Colombia is also assigned a broader awareness-raising 
 
 
 74. Your Voice at Work, supra note 65, at 47, 48–49. 
 75. Id. at 47. In discussing the political and economic changes in Indonesia, the ILO emphasizes 
the importance of the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Id. at 46. 
 76. Id. at 48–49. 
 77. Id. at 98. The report states that: 
[m]aking freedom of association and collective bargaining a reality for more people also 
involves spreading the word about what these rights mean, how they are exercised, and the 
possibilities they offer. In addition to encouraging a broader culture of freedom of association 
and collective bargaining, disseminating relevant information can facilitate specific 
organizing and collective bargaining efforts.  
Id. See also Your Voice at Work, supra note 65. “Part of the key to promoting fundamental principles 
and rights lies in advocacy and awareness-raising measures.” Id. at 84. That report also notes that 
awareness raising is especially important for gaining recognition of freedom of association:  
The status of freedom of association and collective bargaining as fundamental rights is less 
firmly established in the minds of policy-makers, public opinion, and even the ILO’s direct 
constituency, than is the case for the other three categories contained in the Declaration [child 
labor, forced labor, and discrimination]. The prospect for full realization of this category or 
principles and rights will be immeasurably enhanced if the climate of public opinion can be 
shifted in its favor.  
Id. at 60. From 2000–2004, the ILO hosted 42 seminars on the subject around the world with 
approximately 1,175 participants. Organizing for Social Justice, supra note 66, at 101. Based on the 
location and the attendees of the seminars, the subject matter varied from freedom of association to a 
program promoting collective bargaining as a form of social dialogue, to a program about recourse to 
the ILO and its promotional and supervisory machinery. Id. 
 78. ILO Agenda, supra note 56, at app. III, para, 4. 
 79. Id. at app. III, para. 3. 
 80. Id. at app. I, paras. 22, 23. 
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task, which is to “[p]romote . . . a culture of dialogue and compliance with 
the obligations and rights derived from the Colombian Constitution81 and 
from the ILO’s conventions.82” The representative will also have the duty 
 
 
 81. The articles of the Colombian Constitution that are most likely referred to here are Article 53, 
which declares, inter alia, that “international labor agreements duly ratified part [sic] of domestic 
legislation” which would include the ILO conventions that Colombia has ratified. In addition, Article 
55 declares that “[t]he right of collective bargaining to regulate labor relations, with the exceptions 
provided by law, is guaranteed. It is the duty of the state to promote negotiation and other measures 
necessary for the peaceful resolution of collective labor conflicts.” Finally, Article 56 establishes that 
“[t]he right to strike is guaranteed, except in the case of essential public services defined by the 
legislature.” Article 56 also establishes the Labor and Wage Commission described in the fourth 
component of the Agreement. CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA.  
 Although the language of the Constitution seems to clearly establish many fundamental workers’ 
rights, the American Center for International Labor Solidarity notes that “[i]n effect, many 
constitutional protections for core labor standards are trumped by Law 50 of 1990, which gives 
employers broad powers to dismiss workers on the ground of business necessity.” JUSTICE FOR ALL, 
supra note 2, at 22 (citing International Labor Organization, Estudio Comparado: Tendéncias y 
contenidos de la negociación colectiva: Fortalecimiento de las Organizaciones Sindicales de los 
Paises Andinos, Lima: 1998. Ch. 1., available at http://www.oitandina.org.pe/publ/regional/doc88).  
 Despite the fact that Article 93 of the Constitution declares that “[i]nternational treaties and 
agreements ratified by the Congress that recognize human rights and that prohibit their limitation in 
states of emergency have priority domestically,” the ILO treaties, which do not allow for suspension in 
time of emergency, are often undermined by Law 50 of 1990, and other domestic laws. Id.  
 82. The relevant conventions refer to ILO Conventions Nos. 87 and 98. See “Tripartite 
Agreement for the Right of Association and Democracy,” pmbl.  
 Convention No. 87, titled “Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize” was written on June 17, 1948, and joined by Colombia in 1976. It contains, inter 
alia, the following provisions: 
Article 2 
Workers and employers, without distinction whatsoever, shall have the right to establish and, 
subject only to the rules of the organization concerned, to join organizations of their own 
choosing without previous authorization. 
Article 3 
1. Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall have the right to draw up their constitutions 
and rules, to elect their representatives in full freedom, to organize their administration and 
activities and to formulate their programs. 
2. The public authorities shall refrain from any interference which would restrict this right or 
impede the lawful exercise thereof. 
Article 4 
Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall not be liable to be dissolved or suspended by 
administrative authority. 
Article 5 
Workers’ and employers’ organizations shall have the right to establish and join federations 
and confederations and any such organization, federation or confederation shall have the right 
to affiliate with international organizations of workers and employers. 
Article 6 
The provisions of Articles 2, 3 and 4 hereof apply to federations and confederations of 
workers' and employers’ organizations. 
International Labor Convention No. 87 Concerning Freedom of Association—Protection of the Right 
to Organize, June 17, 1948, available at http://www.ilo.ogr/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.p1?CO87. 
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of informing the Colombian government, employers, and workers of 
“comments made by the ILO’s supervisory bodies”83 and of issuing a 
biannual progress report on the implementation of its mandate.84  
Programs informing government officials about the rights of unions, 
and programs informing union members themselves of these rights, could 
help develop the political will necessary to ensure an end to trade union 
violence. The promotion of tripartite dialogue will provide more 
opportunities for discussion among union members, employers, and the 
government, which may lead to a better understanding and increased 
respect among the three groups. Finally, by raising awareness of 
statements made by other ILO bodies about Colombia and issuing its own 
progress reports, the ILO representative will remind the Colombian parties 
that the international community is paying attention to Colombia’s labor 
problems, which should further increase their resolve to end this 
problem.85  
Despite the benefits of the awareness raising programs planned for the 
ILO representative in Colombia, the effectiveness of awareness raising is 
limited. To the extent that violence against union members stems not from 
ignorance of workers’ rights, but rather from hostility towards workers and 
unionization, awareness raising does not address the cause of the 
 
 
Convention No. 98, titled “Convention Concerning the Application of Principles of the Right to 
Organize and to Bargain Collectively,” went into force on July 4, 1950, primarily forbids 
discrimination against union members. International Labor Organization Convention Concerning the 
Application of Principles of the Right to Organize and to Bargain Collectively, July 14, 1950, 
available at http://www.ilo.ogr/ilolex/cgi-lex/convde.p1?CO98. ILO Agenda Nov. 2006, supra note 
56, at app. III, para. 2. 
 83. Id. at app. III, para. 10. This duty specifically mentions statements made by the Committee 
on Freedom of Association. 
 84. Id. at app. III, para. 15. 
 85. The way the international community, and particularly the ILO, views Colombia seems to 
concern the Colombian government. See Capdevila, supra note 31 (mentioning that Colombian official 
interviewed emphasized that the ILO presence in Colombia is not described as an “office,” which 
implies sanctions, and therefore, the Agreement should not be considered a sanction by the ILO).  
 A number of commentators on the Colombian situation have emphasized the constructive role that 
citizens of other nations could play by pressuring their governments into changing their policies 
towards Colombia. Daniel Kovalik writes:  
Although lawsuits help shed light on atrocities, they are not sufficient to end the military and 
corporate support of human rights abusers in Colombia, or to save the lives of Colombia’s 
trade unionists. Such goals will only be attained when a critical mass of concerned citizens 
pressure the government and U.S.-based corporations to bring an end to anti-union violence 
in Colombia via activities such as lobbying within the U.S. Congress, petitioning and protests, 
organizing grassroots movements in Colombia, and providing direct assistance to trade 
unions. 
Kovalik, supra note 4, at 407. See also, JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 69–73 (detailing ways the 
U.S. government, the international community, multinational corporations, and international trade 
unions could help improve the situation in Colombia).  
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problem.86 Indeed, in March 2007, a representative of one of the 
Colombian unions at the ILO stated that “technical cooperation [is] useless 
unless it contribute[s] to reducing anti-trade union violence.”87 That 
statement was echoed in January 2008 by the AFL-CIO, which criticized 
the Colombian government for interpreting the technical cooperation 
element of the Tripartite Agreement to “include only workshops and 
seminars” with no “verification or involvement of the office in protection 
of labor rights.”88 
3. Legal Reform 
The ILO also helps member nations reform their labor laws to provide 
greater protection for workers and ensure their right to organize.89 The 
ILO representative’s mandate includes two major legal reform 
responsibilities: to provide advice “on the formulation of proposals for 
standards related to its mandate,”90 and to “attend meetings at which bills 
relating to the mandate are discussed.”91 It is notable that both legal reform 
tasks given to the ILO representative require the consent of the 
government before the ILO representative can participate in the process.92  
It is unclear whether the ILO representative will be limited to 
participating in the legal reform process with regard to bills and 
regulations relating to labor law, or whether he or she will also be able to 
be involved in criminal law reform. This is important because, while 
Colombia’s labor laws could be reformed to be more hospitable towards 
unions,93 the problem of violence against union members will be most 
 
 
 86. See supra notes 22–23, 26–28 and accompanying text. It is unlikely that the paramilitaries 
who carry out many of the violent acts against union members would cease as a result of awareness 
raising programs. 
 87. International Labor Organization Governing Body, Thirteenth Item on the Agenda: Report of 
the Committee on Technical Cooperation [hereinafter Governing Body Agenda], Mar. 2007, at para. 
57. 
 88. AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR—CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS, 
WORKERS’ RIGHTS, VIOLENCE AND IMPUNITY IN COLOMBIA 16 (2008). 
 89. Organizing for Social Justice, supra note 66, at 88. 
 90. ILO Agenda Nov. 2006, supra note 56, at app. III, para. 5. 
 91. Id. at app. III, para. 6. 
 92. The ILO representative can only provide advice “at the request of the Government and the 
social partners,” id. at app. III, para. 5, and can only attend legislative meetings “if invited by the 
legislature,” id. at app. III, para. 6. 
 93. The Colombian labor code recognizes the right to organize and the right to strike, although 
both are restricted in ways that have drawn criticism from the ILO. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 
21–25. For example, “[A]dministrative authorities allow employers to challenge legal procedures for 
union registration and to dispute the decisions of union executive boards to register a union. This 
violates the ILO’s core labor Conventions 87 and 98, which prohibits any employer interference in 
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effectively addressed through changes in criminal law, and particularly 
criminal law enforcement, rather than through labor law reform alone.94  
Criminal law reform related to violence against union members may be 
seen as part of the ILO representative’s mandate to protect the “physical 
integrity” of workers95 and to “[m]aintain contact” with the Office of the 
Attorney General regarding investigations into acts of violence against 
union members.96 If the ILO representative chooses to become involved in 
criminal law reform, and if the government allows the ILO representative 
to be involved in criminal law reform, there would be an opportunity for 
significant gains in the effort to end violence against union members in 
Colombia.  
4. Administrative Reform and Dispute Resolution 
The ILO also assists nations in reforming how their executive and 
judicial authorities implement labor law,97 which includes promoting 
alternative forms of resolution for disputes between workers and 
employers.98 The ILO representative has numerous responsibilities that 
may impact how Colombian executive and judicial authorities administer 
labor law and other laws that affect the rights of union members.99  
 
 
trade union operation.” Id. at 22 (citing Colombian Trade Union Federation, REPORT TO THE 90TH 
INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE (June 3–20, 2002), available at http://www.ilo.org/public/ 
english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc90/reports.htm).  
 JUSTICE FOR ALL also notes the ILO Committee of Experts criticized various legal obstacles to 
striking in Colombia including the prohibition of federations and confederations of trade unions on 
calling strikes, and the ability of the minister of labor to order a strike to arbitration when it lasts 
longer than a certain time period. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 24.  
 94. The American Center for International Labor Solidarity states that:  
[A]chieving respect for workers’ rights in Colombia will require not only addressing the 
typical needs of reforming labor law to meet international core labor standards while 
improving enforcement. It will also require an end to the violence and impunity stemming 
from a protracted armed conflict that has degenerated into military camps eager to protect 
their drug profits. 
Id. at 59. 
 95. ILO Agenda, supra note 56, at app. III, para. 1. 
 96. Id. at app. III, para. 13. 
 97. Organizing for Social Justice, supra note 66, at 90–92.  
 98. Id. at 97–98. This is an area where the ILO has already been rather active in Colombia, 
training ninety Colombian labor court judges in international labor court standards. Id. at 92. 
Additionally, the ILO has worked with the United States Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 
to advise Colombian workers and employers on alternative dispute resolution. Id. at 97. 
 99. The American Center for International Labor Solidarity criticizes the Colombian judiciary 
and executive’s administration of labor law, stating:  
Anti-union discrimination can be curtailed with effective enforcement. However, the 
Colombian labor courts frequently refuse to apply ILO conventions as a source of law, 
despite the constitutional case law on the subject. Even where judges acknowledge that 
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These responsibilities include the previously mentioned duty to contact 
the Attorney General regarding investigations into trade union violence,100 
the ability to participate in meetings of committees designed to speed up 
the investigations of violence against union members (at the Attorney 
General’s request),101 the ability to provide advice about the 
implementation of various ILO conventions,102 and the ability to foster the 
creation of supervisory mechanisms related to those ILO conventions.103  
The ILO representative has also been given a number of duties that 
promote new forms of alternative dispute resolution, primarily through the 
creation of new forums for tripartite dialogue. These include the authority 
to “[p]articipate in the meetings of the Standing Committee on Labor and 
Wage Policies, and in all other tripartite social dialogue forums,”104 and to 
“[p]romote the resumption of the work of the Special Committee on the 
Handling of Conflicts . . . and participate in its meetings.”105  
It is notable that the ILO representative’s authority varies among these 
responsibilities, from being given the unqualified authority to participate 
in the meetings of the Standing Committee on Labor and Wage Policy, to 
needing to be invited by the Attorney General to participate on a 
committee that would speed up the investigations of trade union murders. 
As the ILO representative’s responsibilities become more related to 
criminal law enforcement, as opposed to labor law, the more tentative his 
or her authority becomes.  
5. Conclusion: Technical Cooperation and Political Will 
The ILO’s case studies of past technical cooperation successes in 
difficult situations note the importance of political will and government 
 
 
unionists have been dismissed in violation of the union privilege for protection against 
dismissal (fuero sindical), they routinely refuse to order reinstatement, arguing that the right 
of the public administration to restructure the organization prevails, or that it is impossible to 
reinstate them because the positions no longer exist. 
 The Ministry of Social Protection exhibits a frequent lack of will, but in any case does 
not have the resources to effectively combat these anti-union practices. 
JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 37 (citing COLOMBIAN TRADE UNION FEDERATIONS REPORT TO 
THE 90TH INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE (June 3–20, 2002), available at http://www.ilo.org/ 
public/English/standards/relm/ilc/ilc90/reports.htm, and cases discussed in ILO Committee on 
Freedom of Association, Report No. 327, Case No. 1962 (2002)). 
 100. ILO Agenda, supra note 56, at app. III, para. 13. 
 101. Id. at app. III, para. 14. 
 102. Id. at app. III, para. 9. 
 103. Id. at app. III, para. 11. 
 104. Id. at app. III, para. 7. 
 105. Id. at app. III, para. 8.  
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leadership in bringing about a societal change in the amount of respect 
given to the rights of workers to freely organize. Applying this to the 
Colombian situation, the success of the ILO permanent representative’s 
goals depends on the Colombian government’s interest in its success. 
While there are certainly ways the ILO representative can have an impact 
on the government’s view of workers rights—such as through the 
awareness-raising programs and the tripartite dialogue forums—the 
government has more power in determining how effective the ILO 
representative can be in putting an end to violence against union 
members.106  
There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic about the Colombian 
government’s interest in the success of the ILO representative. Although, 
in September 2006, labor groups organized an International Day of Action 
to protest the Colombian government’s lack of progress on setting up the 
ILO representative in Colombia,107 that was quickly followed by a 
tripartite meeting that led to the formation of the Working Group, which 
defined the mandate of the ILO Office.108 The office was subsequently 
opened on November 23, 2006,109 with the representative in charge of the 
office arriving in Bogota on January 15, 2007.110  
B. Attorney General’s Special Investigative Group 
As beneficial as the ILO’s technical cooperation program could be in 
resolving the problem of violence against trade union members in 
Colombia, only the Colombian government has the power to end the 
culture of violence with impunity. This is the role played by the Attorney 
General’s Special Investigative Group, the third component of the 
Agreement.  
Human rights groups have been critical of the Attorney General’s 
Office under the Uribe Administration, claiming that it is hostile to human 
 
 
 106. See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 107. See Press Release, International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, International Day of 
Action for Colombia (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.icftu.org/displaydocument.asp?Index= 
991225067&Language=EN (detailing Colombian trade unions’ unhappiness with the government’s 
pace in having the permanent ILO office set up).  
 108. ILO Agenda, supra note 56, at app. I, para. 4. 
 109. INTERNATIONALLY-RECOGNIZED CORE LABOR STANDARDS IN COLOMBIA, supra note 65, at 
4. It should be noted that the same report calls the creation of an ILO office in Colombia the “key 
point” in the agreement. Id. at 3. 
 110. International Labor Organization Committee on Technical Cooperation, Fourth Item on the 
Agenda: Technical Cooperation Program for Colombia, para. 5, Mar. 2007.  
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rights.111 In addition, the fact that under the Uribe Administration public 
sector unions have been the hardest hit by violence112 leads some to 
believe that the Colombian government is not interested in respecting 
workers’ rights.  
However, the Attorney General’s Office has made significant progress 
regarding the investigation of trade union murders since the signing of the 
Agreement. The Attorney General’s Office set up “a special investigation 
group comprising of five special district attorneys” within the Human 
Rights Unit to investigate attacks on union members.113 After evaluating 
the caseload this unit would face, the number of attorneys was increased to 
thirteen.114 This investigative group will be supervised by a committee that 
includes union members, employers, and government officials.115 On 
September 11, 2006, Colombia’s Attorney General held a meeting with 
major labor unions, employers’ organizations, and the Vice-President, to 
discuss 120 cases of attacks on union members that the workers had pre-
selected for investigation,116 using criteria to ensure that they would be 
representative of the violence Colombian union members typically face.117 
The Attorney General also announced an inter-administrative directive that 
would speed up the investigative process for crimes against union 
members and develop plans to combat those crimes.118 Finally, the 
 
 
 111. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 19. The Report states that:  
Although the Colombian government has thousands of cases to pursue, it has failed to 
investigate, prosecute, and bring to justice those responsible for the vast majority of murders 
committed against human rights defenders, and has even eroded its own ability to do so. 
Within 72 hours of taking office in July 2001, Attorney General Osorio forced the 
resignations of a number of high ranking and veteran officials, among them the current and 
former directors of the Human Rights Unit. 
Id. It is worth noting that Mr. Osorio is no longer Colombia’s Attorney General. CIA, World Leaders 
2008, Chiefs of State and Cabinet Members of Foreign Governments, available at https://www.cia. 
gov/library/publications/world-leaders-1/indes.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2008). 
 112. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 19. In 2005, forty-four of the seventy trade unionists 
murdered were teachers. Id. (citing Escuela Nacional Sindical, Informe sobre la violación a los 
derechos humanos de los y las sindicalistas colombianas en el año 2005 10 (2006), available at 
http://www.ens.org.co/aa/img_upload/40785cb6c10f663e3ec6ea7ea03aaa15/INFORME_DE_DDHH_
DE_SINDICALISTAS__COLOMBIANOS_EN_EL_2005.pdf). 
 113. ILO Agenda, supra note 56, at app. I, para. 19. 
 114. INTERNATIONAL TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, 2007 ANNUAL SURVEY OF VIOLATIONS OF 
TRADE UNION RIGHTS: COLOMBIA (2007), available at http://survey07.ituc-csi.org/getcountry.php? 
IDCountry= COL&IDLang=EN. 
 115. ILO Agenda, supra note 56, at app. I, para. 20. 
 116. Id. at app. I, para.16. 
 117. ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Report 343, para. 383, 2006. These criteria 
include that the cases be diverse in terms of both where and when they happened, that they include 
cases with female victims, and, perhaps most importantly, that they include cases which implicate 
guerillas, paramilitaries, and state actors.  
 118. ILO Agenda, supra note 56, at app. I, para. 17. 
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government has financed the investigation, with $1.7 million of the 
Attorney General’s budget earmarked for the Special Investigative Group 
and other programs designed to speed up the investigations of trade union 
murders.119  
Although the actions taken by the Attorney General’s office are 
certainly positive, especially the involvement of unions in selecting the 
cases for investigation and supervising the investigations, a number of 
troubling questions still remain.120 Most notably, there is the legal question 
of whether the Special Investigative Commission will be allowed to 
prosecute and sentence paramilitaries involved in union murders if the 
paramilitaries demobilize and confess to the crimes in accordance with the 
Peace and Justice Law.121 The ILO has noted that the government has not 
answered this question to its satisfaction.122 There is also the larger 
question of the breadth of the investigation and the freedom given to the 
investigators: will they be willing and able to address the issue of 
government and corporate complicity in the murders? The investigators 
have been assigned cases that implicate state actors,123 but will they follow 
through on investigations when the killers are members of the Colombian 
military?  
Perhaps most importantly, there is the question of whether the 
government’s willingness to investigate trade union murders will translate 
into a willingness to change other government policies that contribute to 
the atmosphere of violence that surrounds trade unions in Colombia. For 
example, will they be willing to provide effective protection to trade 
unionists who believe their lives are in danger and end a policy of hostility 
towards public sector unions? It is only by making changes that go beyond 
the Agreement that the Colombian government could prove to critics that 
it sincerely desires to end violence against union members.124  
 
 
 119. Id. at app. I, para. 12. 
 120. Despite repeated emails to the Colombian Attorney General and the Colombian embassy in 
Washington, D.C., including three in the two weeks before I finished this Note, I did not receive any 
response from them, and therefore do not have their answers to these questions. 
 121. See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text. 
 122. ILO Committee on Freedom of Association, Report 348, para. 343, 2007.  
 123. See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
 124. JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 2, at 66–68 (describing what the American Center for 
International Labor Solidarity sees as the role of the Colombian government in improving the 
condition for workers in Colombia, including going beyond solving the problem of violence against 
union members to other labor problems in Colombia, such as forced labor and child labor). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The problem of violence against trade union members in Colombia is 
one with a multitude of contributing factors. There is no way that the 
“Tripartite Agreement for the Right of Association and Democracy” can, 
by itself, end the violence. But the Agreement is a step in the right 
direction, and if the Colombian government demonstrates the political will 
to make the Agreement as effective as possible, it could be a very 
significant step.  
A member of the American Center for International Labor Solidarity 
remarked that progress is occurring in Colombia, but it is slow.125 In 2007, 
the first year that the ILO representative was stationed in Colombia, the 
number of trade union murders decreased to thirty-eight.126 However, as 
the AFL-CIO noted, Colombia remains “in a class of its own.”127 Although 
the establishment of the ILO office has been praised by all parties, 
workers’ groups express concern that the office is not currently receiving 
“adequate human and financial resources” in order to ensure its success.128 
Indeed, it consists of one representative and one secretary, with no legal or 
technical support.129 Nevertheless, the mere fact that the Colombian 
government, employers, and unions have expressed a willingness to work 
together to create not only the Agreement, but to also define the scope of 
the ILO representative’s mandate, is very significant progress.  
The progress made in the formation and funding of the Attorney 
General’s Special Investigative Group shows that the Colombian 
government appears to be fulfilling its role, although its commitment to 
the Agreement is doubted by some workers’ rights advocates.130 Certainly, 
the government’s past record on workers’ rights, and human rights in 
general, provides reason to be skeptical about its interest in ending 
violence against union members.131 Nonetheless, given the importance the 
 
 
 125. Email from Esperanza Avalos, Program Officer, Americas, American Center for 
International Labor Solidarity, to author (Feb. 12, 2007) (on file with author). 
 126. WORKERS’ RIGHTS, VIOLENCE AND IMPUNITY, supra note 88, at 3.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Governing Body Agenda, supra note 87, para. 57. 
 129. WORKERS’ RIGHTS, VIOLENCE AND IMPUNITY, supra note 88, at 16. 
 130. Id. at 16 (stating the Colombian government has shown a “lack of respect for ILO” and that 
the AFL-CIO has “serious concerns about the lack of political support for the office”). 
 131. Email from ITUC TURights Representative (identified only as F.), to Nancy Ramirez and 
Manuela Chavez (Feb. 12, 2007), contained this quote from my email “I am interested whether they 
think the government is serious about its commitment to ending the violence” with the comment “I 
think we have some explaining to do!”) Email forwarded to author by Nancy Ramirez, of International 
Trade Union Confederation, on Feb. 12, 2007 (on file with author). 
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ILO places on political will for the success of its technical cooperation 
programs, the success of the Tripartite Agreement depends largely on the 
will of the Colombian government.  
This does not mean that there is nothing that anyone outside of the 
Colombian government can do to promote the success of the Tripartite 
Agreement. In the year since I first submitted this Note for publication, 
two reports on the issue of violence against union members in Colombia 
have been issued: one by Amnesty International132 and another by the 
AFL-CIO.133 Hopefully these reports, and others like them, will keep the 
attention of the international community, especially the labor and human 
rights communities, focused on Colombia. It is essential that the issue of 
violence against union members in Colombia continues to be raised 
around the world. If other nations provide political and financial support 
for the ILO office in Colombia, either in lieu of or as a condition of other 
types of aid to Colombia,134 that pressure would likely make President 
Uribe’s government more willing to meet its obligations under the 
Tripartite Agreement. Indeed, the United States, which provided $728 
million in foreign aid (primarily military) to Colombia in 2006,135 could 
have a substantial impact on this issue, if it desires. 
While violence against labor unions in Colombia has been a serious 
problem for a long time, it does not have to remain so. The Tripartite 
Agreement for the Right of Association and Democracy represents an 
opportunity for the Colombian government, employers, and labor unions 
to work together to bring an end to this tragic problem. Hopefully the 
international community will encourage the Colombian government to 
meet its obligations. The success of the Agreement would be a triumph, 
not just for Colombian union members, or for the nation of Colombia, but 
for supporters of human rights worldwide. 
Daniel Richard Kuehnert∗
 
 
 132. COLOMBIA: KILLINGS, ARBITRARY DETENTIONS, AND DEATH THREATS—THE REALITY OF 
TRADE UNIONISM IN COLOMBIA, supra note 44. 
 133. WORKERS’ RIGHTS, VIOLENCE AND IMPUNITY, supra note 88, at 3. 
 134. Governing Body Agenda, supra note 87, paras. 57, 65. 
 135. Amnesty International, US Military Aid to Colombia, http://www.amnestyusa.org/Colombia/ 
US_Military_Aid_to_Colombia/page.do?id=1101863&n1=3&n2=30&n3=885 (last visited Apr. 23, 
2008). 
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